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ABSTRACT
Although the events of the past year are in many ways unprecedented, they have resulted in circumstances
that are common throughout history. The rise of a global pandemic has led to suffering in many forms,
political powers shifting, militant coups rising, and countries facing protests as civil unrest becomes more
prevalent. In these uncertain times, political leaders and the role militaries have been even more scrutinized,
revealing flaws that might have remained undetected if it was not for circumstances going awry. These
current events have caused us to reflect upon incidents of the past when commanders have faced the
uncertainty of how to complete their mission. History is wrought with instances in which the commander,
despite having a “Plan B,”still fails to succeed in his role, thus resulting in hundreds of thousands of
unnecessary lives lost. Specifically, this article focuses on three death marches—The Long Walk of the Navajo,
The Bataan Death March, and Holocaust Death Marches—and the international law of command
responsibility. In comparing and contrasting these three historic events through the lens of this law, we
analyze the imposition of a commander’s criminal liability when unexpected events occur and he or she is
called upon to make difficult decisions. In doing so, we also provide a historical backdrop of each
commander’s ethical, moral, and tactical decisions, allowing us to explore what else could have been done,
and who should be held liable for the actions of the commander’s soldiers. Ultimately, we call on national
leaders and military commanders alike to evaluate our uncomfortable contemporary reality, look back in
history, and ask themselves one question: am I truly prepared to make the right decisions when things go
wrong?

Keywords: Command responsibility, Bataan death march, holocaust death march, the long walk of the
Navajo, extremism, nationalism, Iraq, My Lai
Wee, sleeket, cowran, tim’rous beastie,
O, what a panic’s in thy breastie!
Thou need na start awa sae hasty,
Wi’ bickerin brattle!
I wad be laith to rin an’ chase thee
Wi’ murd’ring pattle!

Thou saw the fields laid bare an’ waste,
An’ weary Winter comin fast,
An’ cozie here, beneath the blast,
Thou thought to dwell,
Till crash! the cruel coulter past
Out thro’ thy cell.

I’m truly sorry Man’s dominion
Has broken Nature’s social union,
An’ justifies that ill opinion,
Which makes thee startle,
At me, thy poor, earth-born companion,
An’ fellow-mortal!

But Mousie, thou art no thy-lane,
In proving foresight may be vain:
The best laid schemes o’ Mice an’ Men
Gang aft agley,
An’ lea’e us nought but grief an’ pain,
For promis’d joy!1

1

Robert Burns, To a Mouse, POETRY FOUND.,
https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/43816/to-a-mouse56d222ab36e33 (last visited Feb. 15, 2021).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Command responsibility evokes images of a commander
who has imbued those under his or her command with
principles of military ethics, discipline, and values
reflective of the profession of arms. To some extent, this is
the glamorized Hollywood version of the sharp-eyed
commander, cool under fire, with troops ready for orders,
confident in each other, and well prepared for what lies
ahead. The screen is filled with strong-willed, handsome,
fit, and trim commanders leading their troops in battle,
willing to engage their foes.
This is good against evil, forces of light against forces of
darkness. The films depict clarity in leadership. There is an
absence of grey, there is no nuance, and lose-lose dilemmas
do not exist. We, the viewers, demand this clarity. We, the
public, demand that our (italics deliberate) commander
makes the right decision. We do so because we view the
commander as an extension of ourselves, reflecting our
norms, values, and principles.
The demand for normative behavior is unspoken but clear.
We do not feel the need to tell the commander, “Be the best
human being you can,” because we expect him or her to
always make the right decision. After all, the commander
is someone we know – our neighbor’s son or co-worker’s
daughter – and we expect nothing but the best from them.
They are us; we are them. We are caught off guard and find
it difficult to accept the reality that our commander or
soldier may fail to live up to our idealistic expectations.
Were it only so simple.
Anyone who understands military engagement knows
reality can best be described as, “uncertainty rules.”
History offers a stark warning, brilliantly captured by the
poet, Robert Burns, with whose words we opened this
article. Burns’ words are particularly apt for the military
commander confronting events best described as
unforeseen. In focusing on instances when things go awry,
we pay particular heed to Burns’ words: “The best laid
schemes o’ Mice an’ Men, Gang aft agley, An’ lea’e us
nought but grief an’ pain, For promis’d joy!2
The relevance of this undertaking could not be more acute.
During the past year, then-President Trump, acting in his role
as commander-in-chief, requested the use of the military in
instances of peaceful protest in the nation’s capital. This led
2

Id.

3

Ashton Carter, et al., 10 Former Defense Secretaries Military
Secretaries: Involving the Military in Election Disputes would Cross
into Dangerous Territory, WASH. POST. (Jan. 3, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/10-formerdefense-secretaries-military-peaceful-transfer-ofpower/2021/01/03/2a23d52e-4c4d-11eb-a9f40e668b9772ba_story.html; Matt Seyler, Defense secretaries’ letter
warning Trump was signed by all in only 2 days, ABC NEWS (Jan. 5,
2021, 3:06 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/defensesecretaries-letter-warning-trump-signeddays/story?id=75036788.
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the ten living former defense secretaries to write a letter
declaring, “there’s no role for the U.S. military in determining
the outcome of a U.S. election.”3 Without further examining
the actions or motives of President Trump, it is clear that the
recent events in the U.S. expose the tenuousness of commonly
accepted fabrics that are the essence of society.
Additionally, the world continues to face the effects of the
unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic and continued civil
unrest.4 Just weeks after the breach on the U.S. Capitol, a
coup arose in Myanmar placing the military back in
charge 5 , and it is expected that “75 countries will likely
experience an increase in protests” as “socioeconomic
fallout from COVID-19 mounts.”6
There are different means of exploring the consequences of
these deeply troubling events: one can ignore them with a
shrug of the shoulders, or one can take stock, explore
history, and ask what we can learn from past experiences
and examples.
We have chosen the second option, believing that learning
from history will provide critical markers for commanders
confronting dilemmas when things go wrong. We provide
stark examples regarding the consequences of
commanders who failed to protect the lives of vulnerable
human beings for which they were responsible. It is
immaterial why they were in the terrible situation in which
they found themselves; the blame game is of no
consequence or import when considering how
commanders played the hand they were dealt.
We focus on three particularly tragic and dark moments
that took place under distinct, harsh, almost unimaginable
conditions, thereby enabling us to draw conclusions from
three different paradigms. While other examples were
available, the three we examine provide rich material
regarding the actions of commanders and soldiers when
matters truly go awry.
The Long Walk of the Navajo, the Bataan Death March, and
Holocaust Death Marches represent examples where
commanders were severely tested, and ultimately failed.
The unexpected circumstances of these marches resulted in
dangerous territory when societal norms and mores broke
down and an overwhelming power imbalance arose
between distinct groups. As a result, each march imposed
extraordinary suffering and deprivation on its victims; the
4
Tim Campbell & Miha Hribernik, A dangerous new era of
civil unrest is dawning in the United States and around the world,
VERISK
PERSPECTIVES
(Dec.
10,
2020),
https://www.maplecroft.com/insights/analysis/a-dangerousnew-era-of-civil-unrest-is-dawning-in-the-united-states-andaround-the-world/.
5
Alice Cuddy, Myanmar coup: What is happening and why?,
BBC NEWS (Feb. 9, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-55902070.
6

See Campbell & Hribernik, supra note 4.
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events amongst the worst of the worst when considering
the actions of commanders and soldiers alike. The
challenges confronting the commanders were difficult.
However, that cannot be offered as justification for their
conduct nor available as a defense by future commanders.
The responsibility placed on their shoulders is absolute
and any attempt to justify misbehavior because of external
conditions must be roundly rejected. This is important
when we examine the three examples and lessons learned.
Our focus on these events stems from two concerns. First,
that current international circumstances impose unique
challenges on commanders and, second, that contemporary
strife and conflict potentially place the vulnerable in
situations reminiscent of those confronted by the victims of
these Death Marches. In focusing on paradigms when
circumstances go awry, our intention is to draw attention to
the dilemma of imposing liability on a commander in two
distinct instances: when the commander is physically
present yet loses control of those under him or her and the
second, the more complicated and nuanced, when the
commander is not present and those under his or her
command ---albeit their absence---commit heinous crimes.
As we consider the ethical, moral, and tactical decisions each
commander made, the analysis will also probe into questions
of what else could have been done and who should be held
liable for the actions of the soldiers under one’s command.
The three death marches provide a unique viewpoint in
which to undertake this analysis, whose urgency is palpable
given domestic and international events alike.
This essay will be divided into the following sections:
Section II: Commanders; Section III: The Long Walk, The
Bataan Death March, and Holocaust Death Marches;
Section IV: History of Command Responsibility; Section V:
The Final Word.

II. COMMANDERS
Commanders and soldiers know what is expected of them.
Each has a clear understanding of the task they are to
perform, the parameters of their undertaking, and the
consequences of failing. In its most pristine form, command
responsibility results in the completion of a task in an
organized, clear, and precise manner. The commander is
trained---at least in the ideal---to explain the mission, to
understand each person’s role and responsibility, to
maintain full control of the unit, and to protect the lives of
combatant and non-combatant alike, with the caveat that
conflict invariably includes injury and loss of life.

7
“The U.S. abides by the laws of war…In waging war we do
not terrorize helpless non-combatants, if it is within our power to
avoid doing so. Wanton killing, torture, cruelty or the working of
hardship on enemy prisoners or populations is not justified in any
circumstance…the main safeguard against lawlessness and
hooliganism in any armed body is the integrity of its officers.
When men know that their commander is absolutely opposed to

Furthermore, the commander is expected to be sufficiently
resourceful so that when events go “sideways” there is a
Plan B and if necessary, a Plan C. In other words,
everything is under control and when it is not, the
commander knows how to respond to the unexpected
while minimizing the harm to those for whom he or she is
responsible. At the very least, that is the romanticized
version of command responsibility. The commander gives
an order, and the soldier performs. The unit continues
smoothly—marching and advancing unabated in unison—
until the commander can report “mission accomplished.”
However, history shows us that a commander’s reaction to
a situation is unknown until he or she is in the moment. It
is at that time that we see that not all commanders are fit
for their position. Even those who have been well-trained,
and are seemingly fit to serve, can be overwhelmed in the
moment and unable to balance powerful competing
interests. Others are psychologically unfit, evil, sadistic, or
deeply flawed. Yet they are entrusted with a unit and are
responsible for the consequences of its actions.
Despite commonly recognized and understood principles
of the international law of armed conflict and international
humanitarian law, the innocent have paid a terrible price
for the horrific actions of a unit led by an unfit
commander. 7 Although unfortunate, international law
tolerates instances of collateral damage—when innocent
lives are lost notwithstanding a commander’s efforts to
respect and protect human life while still carrying out the
mission—provided it is proportionate and reasonable.
This article will focus on instances in which the mission has
not gone as planned and the commander faces the
unexpected burden of caring for groups of individuals for
whom the commander assumes responsibility as a result of
the conflict. These individuals include soldiers who are
hors de combat – soldiers who are wounded and incapable
of fighting, surrendered, or taken prisoner - and civilians.
The word “burden” is used deliberately, albeit with
discomfort, for it reflects a negative connotation. In reality,
the additional group for whom the commander now bears
responsibility is a burden. The commander is responsible
for feeding, sheltering, and protecting them despite the fact
that he or she is not equipped—logistically, tactically, or
strategically—for this responsibility imposed on him or her
as a consequence of the conflict.
The true test of command responsibility is in these most
dire of circumstances, when things have gone awry. This
brings us to the question of how to apply the duty of
command responsibility in a paradigm for which there is
such excesses and will take forceful action to repress any breach
of discipline, they will conform. But when an officer winks at any
depredation [sic] by his men, it is no different than if he
committed the act.” UNITED STATES OFFICE OF INFORMATION FOR
THE ARMED FORCES, THE ARMED FORCES OFFICER 191-92 (1975).
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no preparation, for which staff and command colleges do
not train commanders, and which is outside the basic
expectations imposed on the commander.
In the context of death marches, failing to properly provide
for soldiers who are hors de combat and civilians has
resulted in tragedy, the consequences of which are searing,
both in the moment and for years to come. That is true
regardless of whether the “at-risk” human is a civilian or a
combatant. Both have placed their lives in the hands of the
commander, and both are dependent on the commander to
protect them and ensure their safety and well-being.
In the following sections of this article, we have chosen to
examine command responsibility in three very different
death marches—each with distinct contexts, environments,
participants, and purposes. However, there are sufficient
similarities --- differences notwithstanding --- that enable
comparison and allow us to draw conclusions that apply
to all three.
In examining The Long Walk (TLW), The Bataan Death
March (BDM), and Holocaust Death Marches (HDM), this
article discusses the legal and moral dilemmas in the
relevant historical, cultural, and military contexts. Our
goal in doing so is to most accurately present the respective
narratives so the reader can better understand the setting
and dilemmas. There is, of course, risk in doing so as it may
be interpreted as presenting the commander in a
sympathetic light. We have no intention of doing so.
However, we do intend to present the facts and
circumstances as they were known to the commander at
the time. Otherwise, drawing conclusions and offering
lessons learned would be intellectually dishonest.
The question of command responsibility when the lives of
unarmed, helpless, and particularly vulnerable individuals
are at stake is, tragically, not confined to the three marches
we address. While TLW, BDM, and HDM were an
unmitigated horror for those forced to march, the
importance of the three marches extends well beyond the
unimaginable deprivations suffered by the victims. It is for
that reason that exploring the legal responsibility of the
commander is of the utmost importance and relevance. This
is not intended to be a history lesson, as important as that is,
but rather to examine a moment in history through the lens
of the law and to, then, apply that law to dilemmas today.

(129-146)

The term “death march” was likely coined after the Holocaust
Death Marches after World War II. 8 When viewed in this
light, various elements must reflect the circumstances of those
marches to be included in our definition. First, there must be
a use of force in conducting the march. Second, there must be
an existence of harsh conditions inflicted either by those
leading the march or as a result of geography and climate.
Third, there must be a lack of care for the victims of the march.
As will be further discussed below, the marches we have
chosen each include these three elements and, despite their
differences, provide circumstances under which command
responsibility was tested and failed.
Although there are many events under which our analyses
could have been applied, we chose to focus on these three
death marches because they share similarities in that the
preparation and plans have failed in such a way that has
resulted in the intentional destruction of life. As the world is
currently in an unprecedented state, looking back on these
most extreme cases is important to understand the caution a
commander must take when the mission has gone awry.
Through the lens of these three historically significant
marches, we will compare and contrast whether to impose
liability on a commander in two different circumstances.
One being when the commander is physically present and
the other when the commander is not present. As we
consider the ethical, moral, and tactical decisions each
commander made, the analysis will also probe into
questions of what else could have been done and who
should be held liable for the crimes of the soldiers in action.
The discussion of historical context is not a complete
history of each of these death marches. Nor is it meant to
compare the suffering of the Navajo, Jews, and American
and Philippine POW’s. In fact, each group was viewed and
treated as less than human, and the pains of these events
cannot fully be understood except by those who lived
through them. Rather, it is important to understand the
historical context under which the marches were
conducted as it allows for further analysis of instances in
which commanders faced unforeseen circumstances and
potential liability for the actions of their subordinates. As
we compare the death marches below, we will focus on key
events that led up to the march, the location of
commanders, the actions of commanders and subordinate
soldiers, and finally, the consequences and liability
imposed on the commanders.

III. THE LONG WALK OF THE NAVAJO, THE BATAAN
DEATH MARCH, HOLOCAUST DEATH MARCHES

A. The Long Walk of the Navajo

In this section, we will view the doctrine of command
responsibility through the lens of The Long Walk of the
Navajo, The Bataan Death March, and Holocaust Death
Marches. This first requires a further explanation of what
constitutes a death march.

The history between early European settlers in America
and Native American tribes sheds light on the complexity
of the relationship between these parties. It also shows the
lengths the settlers went through to annihilate Native
American tribes or remove them from their lands and
assimilate the population into the settler’s idea of a “self-

8

1. Historical Context

I remember Guiora mentioning something about this
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sustaining” people.9 As the settlers moved south and west
across what is now the United States, political leaders’
enacted legislation to achieve this goal.10 In 1830, Congress
enacted the Indian Removal Act giving the President the
authority to “cause any territory . . . west of the Mississippi,
. . . to be divided into a suitable number of districts, for the
reception of such tribes or nations of Indians” who enter
into an exchange treaty.11
This ultimately led to the removal of five Native American
tribes (the Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, Seminole, and
Cherokee) from southeastern states 12 to the west of the
Mississippi in what is now known as the Trail of Tears.
Following the relocation of these Native Tribes, Congress
continued to incentivize the reservation system created
under the Indian Removal Act and, in 1851, adopted the
Indian Appropriations Act. This Act prohibited Native
Americans from leaving the reservations without first
receiving permission.
During this same period, many American settlers sought
to expand to the western territories of the United States and
beyond. In pursuit of fulfilling the idea of manifest destiny,
the US eventually obtained 500,000 square miles of land
after the Mexican American War, stretching “westward
from the Rio Grande to the Pacific Ocean.” 13 This area
included what became the U.S. New Mexico Territory after
the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1853.14
American settlers began to populate this territory decades
before this treaty was signed.15 Conflicts between American
settlers and Native Americans arose frequently as natives,
with good reason, challenged settlers as they laid claim to
9
2 EDWIN L. SABIN, KIT CARSON DAYS: ADVENTURES IN THE
PATH OF EMPIRE, 708 (1935) [hereinafter KIT CARSON DAYS] (“to
take them out of their country, educate the children, so that they
will grow up with new ideas; for, on a reservation ‘until they can
raise enough to be self-sustaining you can feed them cheaper than
you can fight them.’”)(citing Carleton to the adjutant-general,
Lorenzo Thomas, Sept. 6, 1863.).; JENNIFER DENETDALE, THE LONG
WALK: THE FORCED NAVAJO EXILE 70 (Paul C. Rosier eds., 2008)
[hereinafter THE LONG WALK] (“Once relocated, native peoples
could begin the process of indoctrination.”).
10

There were series of treaties between the US government
and Native American Tribes that also played a large role in the
eventual adoption of the Indian Removal Act. However, many of
these seem to be negotiated with Tribe leaders under coercion or
military power or with leaders who did not have the best interest
of the tribe in mind. See Indian Treaties and the Removal Act of 1830,
UNITED
STATES
OFFICE
OF
THE
HISTORIAN,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/indian-treaties
(last visited Feb. 15, 2021); Elizabeth Prine Pauls, Trail of Tears,
BRITANNICA
(Nov.
11,
2019),
https://www.britannica.com/event/Trail-of-Tears (explaining
that “a small group of Seminole leaders negotiated a removal
agreement in 1832, but a majority of the tribe protested that the
signatories had no authority to represent them.”). For a history of
the Indian Removal Act see Indian Removal Act: Primary Documents
in
American
History,
LIBRARY
OF
CONGRESS,
https://guides.loc.gov/indian-removal-act/digital-collections
(last visited Feb. 15, 2021).

the land and objected to attempts to control or subjugate
them.16 Between 1846 and 1861, the Navajo and American
settlers had entered into a series of peace treaties. Each party
broke promises made in these treaties, causing more unrest
and tension. Aggression continued unabated during much
of this period and at times broke out into an “all-out war
between the Navajos and the U.S. Army.”17
The relationship between the Navajo and the Americans
was anything but friendly. In fact, the Americans viewed
the Navajo as an enemy. 18 As written by New Mexico
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, James L. Collins, in 1860,
“the Navajos … are at war with our people, their hostilities
never having entirely ceased since the war of 1858. The
destruction of life and property that has resulted from this
long-continued unsettled condition of the tribe has been
immense…”19
2. The Campaign
In 1861, the Navajos and American settlers agreed to a treaty
of peace which was signed by 24 of the 31 Navajo Chiefs and
was subsequently ratified by the Senate on February 15,
1861.20 Months later, the Civil War began and many military
leaders in New Mexico were being called back to fight in the
war. As these changes were being made, the feud between the
Navajo and the American settlers continued to heighten
eventually resulting in a Navajo attack on the settlers. 21
shortly after a battle fought by the U.S. military at the border
of the New Mexico-Texas territory line.
The settlers viewed this as a breach of the peace treaty
entered into only months earlier and became the final act
11
Statutes at Large, 21st Congress, 1st Session,
https://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=004/llsl004.db&recNum=459
(last visited Feb. 15, 2021)
12

North Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Alabama, and
Tennessee.
See
Trail
of
Tears,
BRITANNICA
https://cdn.britannica.com/18/186318-050-1CC1339A/Routesstatistics-events-Trail-of-Tears.jpg (last visited Feb. 15, 2021);
Pauls, supra note 10.
13

Mexican-American War, BRITANNICA (NOV. 10, 2020),
https://www.britannica.com/event/Mexican-American-War.
14

New Mexico joins the Union, HISTORY (Feb. 9, 2010)
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/new-mexicojoins-the-union.
15

See THE LONG WALK, supra note 9 at 23.

16

Id.

17

Id. at 35.

18

Id. at 23.

19

3 J. LEE CORRELL, THROUGH WHITE MAN’S EYES: A
(1979).

CONTRIBUTION TO NAVAJO HISTORY 74-75
20

Id. at 130. See also LAWRENCE KELLY, NAVAJO ROUNDUP 1
(1970) [hereinafter NAVAJO ROUNDUP].
21

See (the attack happened shortly after a battle fought by
the U.S. military at the border of the New Mexico-Texas territory
line at the beginning of the Civil War).
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that pushed the U.S. Military stationed in the territory to
action to assimilate the Navajo people and extinguish their
culture. Despite the pressure of the Civil War, the United
States still viewed the acquiring of western land as key and
passed the Homestead Act in 1862. Ultimately, the
authority from the Indian Removal Act, when combined
with the ideals of the Homestead Act, led the military to
the decision to remove the Navajo from their homeland.
Together the Navajo and the Mescalero Apaches would
populate the reservation of Bosque Redondo.
The campaign to march the Navajo to Bosque Redondo
was originally to be conducted by General Edward S.
Canby, who was a proponent of the relocation efforts
under the Indian Removal Act. However, General Canby
was eventually called back east to assist with the efforts of
the Civil War.
In his place, Brigadier General James Carleton took charge
of the relocation efforts. “Carleton was known by his
constituents as the ‘Christian general’ and a humanitarian
who believed that Christian and moral instruction of
native peoples would ensure that they would be accepted
into American society.”22 He also believed that relocation
would be a success and prevent future conflict and on
various occasions stated, “we can feed them for cheaper
than we can fight them.”23
To accomplish this goal of assimilation, Carleton created
the Bosque Redondo reservation at Fort Sumner. The
purpose of Bosque Redondo was experimental. Similar to
the reservations in Oklahoma, the Navajo and Mescalero
Indian tribes would be grouped into villages and learn the
ways of “civilization.”24 To help the Navajo “become white
men,” 25 Carleton organized Bosque Redondo with the
purpose to “feed and take care of [the Navajo] until they
have opened farms and [become] able to support
themselves.”26 Carleton had also appointed a chaplain to
educate the “Indian children.”27
However, for Carleton’s experiment to begin, the Native
Americans had to ‘agree’ to terms of surrender of their
homelands, at the cost of their lives. On June 15, 1863, in
response to continued conflict with the Navajo, Carleton,
through General Orders No. 15,28 instructed Christopher ‘Kit’
Carson to “prosecute a vigorous war against the men of [the
22

See THE LONG WALK, supra note 9 at 70.

23

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 57.

24

Id. Farming, religious teaching and the American way;
(“[Carleton was] a man of his time, he followed federal Indian
policies for dealing with native peoples, meaning that they should
become ‘white men.'”).

Navajo] tribe until it is considered that they have been
effectually punished for their long-continued atrocities.”29
Carson was well known by both Native Americans and
American settlers as he served as a guide to newcoming
settlers and as an Indian agent for the U.S. Military. 30
Although he was a soldier for only a short time “he carried
. . . orders out with zeal and with a haste that was unusual
and a big part of his character.”31 His sense of duty to order
was one of his greatest strengths and, at the same time, one
of his greatest faults. At times this duty led him to follow
an order that would seem to “violate his personality.” 32
This sense of duty to order and his extensive knowledge
and understanding of the Native American tribes in the
western territory made him the perfect officer to complete
Carleton’s goal.
In a letter to Carson, Carleton attached the Order and
explained that “all those Navajo who claimed not to have
murdered and robbed the inhabitants must come in and go
to the Bosque Redondo where they would be fed and
protected until the war (against the Navajo) was over.”33
Additionally, the letter stated that “unless they were
willing to do this, they would be considered hostile and
would be proceeded against accordingly.”34 As the chosen
leader for the campaign, Carson attacked the Navajo land
with a scorched earth approach, in an attempt to force
surrender. His troops lived on Navajo crops, and what was
not needed was burned to the ground. Livestock was either
captured for use or killed and left to decay.35 Trees were
also leveled to the ground. These methods used by Carson
led the Navajo to believe this was a war of extermination.36
Instead of surrender, the Navajo fled to Canyon De Chelly
(Tseyi'), a Navajo stronghold in which the people were able
to hide from Carson’s troops and shield themselves from
the desert climate. The Canyon had high walls and the
Navajo often used Spider Rock, “a towering needle-like
formation,” as a place of refuge.37 The Navajo used yucca
ladders to climb to the top of the rock formation and then
pull the ladders up so that their pursuers could not capture
them.38 Carson soon realized that his initial approach was
unsuccessful, as very few of the Navajo surrendered.39
Throughout the first months of the campaign, Carson faced
challenges in securing strategic and tactical help, as Carleton
31
Hampton
Sides
Interview,
PBS
21-31,
https://www.pbsutah.org/file/20547/download?token=weYU
EQii (last visited Feb. 17, 2021) [hereinafter Sides Interview].
32

Id.

33

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 21.

34

Id. 20-21.

25

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 57.

35

26

Id.

THE LONG WALK, supra note 9 at 43.

36

27

Id.

Id.

37

28

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 21.

THE LONG WALK, supra note 9 at 42.

38

29

Id.

Id.

39
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THE LONG WALK, supra note 9 at 40.
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denied some of his requests. For example, Carson petitioned
Carleton to compensate Ute Indians who agreed to help in the
campaign. As payment for helping the military pursue and
trap the Navajo, Carson argued that, as was customary, the
Ute Indians expected to keep some of the captured Navajo
women and children as slaves. To Carleton’s credit, he denied
this request and emphasized that “all prisoners must be sent
to Santa Fe and ultimately to Bosque Redondo and that there
must be no exception to this rule.”40
Despite decisions such as this, Carleton was not involved
in the day-to-day tactical decisions of the troops. In fact,
there are very few Navajo stories about Carleton, and most
focus on Carson. 41 Stationed back in the New Mexican
Territory, Carleton served more as a messenger than a
General. He received reports from Carson out in the
Navajo homeland and reported these to his command in
Washington. Notwithstanding his removed role, 42
Carleton continued to push Carson to advance into
Canyon De Chelly to force the Navajo into surrender as
winter fell on the region. Carson eventually accepted these
orders, but it was not without objection.43
In addition to the tactical issues Carson faced, the
campaign also brought with it many distractions in the
form of disciplinary problems. While Carson’s troops were
stationed at Fort Canby 44 there were various reports of
intoxicated officers, many of whom got into fights, and
prostitutes living at the camp.45 Additionally, while Carson
was scouting, the New Mexican officers and the ranking
Major Thomas Blakeney – a Major in the Californian
Volunteers prior to his request to join the Navajo
expedition – did not see eye to eye.46 Blakeney did not view
the campaign the same as Carson did and acted harshly
toward the officers he oversaw, and toward the Navajo
who came to surrender at Fort Canby.47
40
KIT CARSON DAYS, supra note 9 at 712; NAVAJO ROUNDUP,
supra note 20 at 29-31.
41
Jennifer
Denetdale
Interview,
PBS
15,
https://www.pbsutah.org/file/20547/download?token=weYU
EQii (last visited Feb. 17, 2021) (in asked about General Carleton)
[hereinafter Denetdale Interview].
42

Sides Interview, supra note 30 at 29 (explaining that
Carleton “ran this campaign from afar.”).
43

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 68 (Carson’s
reluctance to undertake a winter campaign had been conveyed to
Santa Fe before).
44

Fort Canby history -

45

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 51; see also KIT CARSON
DAYS, supra note 9 at 712-13. Officers found out Carson could not
read told him orders were for other things but all really for
whiskey. Carson eventually had his adjutant Lt. Murphy read all
orders before signing.
46

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 44-51.

47

Id. Three Navajo came to the fort to discuss terms of
surrender. There were between 75-100 that were going to
surrender with them. Blakeney never interacted with the 75-100
Navajos but, according to claims of subordinate soldiers, ordered

In addition to these distractions, Carson was often thinking
about home.48 He petitioned Carleton on several occasions to
pause the campaign and asked for a leave of absence to visit
his family from whom he had been absent for nearly two
years. 49 In efforts to push the campaign forward, Carleton
assigned volunteer Captain Asa B. Carey 50 to assist in
overseeing Fort Canby when Carson was on scouting trips.
Additionally, Carleton gave Carson hope that he could return
to his family as he would allow Carson to turn authority over
to Captain Carey “as soon as [he had] secured one hundred
captive Navajo men women and children.”51
Carleton’s push for the campaign to continue was
invigorated when he saw the first of the Navajo surrender
at Fort Wingate. 52 By this time, Delgadito, an influential
Navajo Chief, surrendered with 187 of his people. 53
Delgadito and three other Navajos stayed at Bosque
Redondo for a short time before they were sent back to
their homeland to convince other Navajos to surrender and
to come to Bosque Redondo.54
On January 6, 1864, Carson finally departed for Canyon De
Chelly. 55 Although heavy snow made travel difficult,
Carson’s militia entered Canyon De Chelly in two groups
and each was successful in communicating with the
Navajos who had sheltered in the Canyon. 56 After the
initial contact with the Navajo in the Canyon, more Navajo
continued to surrender.57 By late January, Carson reported
that there were 500 Navajo at Fort Canby, ready to be
transferred to Bosque Redondo.58
Carleton was pleased by the results of the raid on Canyon
De Chelly and by the efforts of Delgadito.59 But it is clear
from his letters that “he did not anticipate the magnitude
of the surrenders which had already begun.”60 The pattern
of group surrender continued throughout the rest of the
campaign. As the Navajos were notified that American
that the three Navajo that came to camp were to be treated as
prisoners and to have them killed.
48

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 68-69.

49

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 68.

50

Id. at 108. Captain Carey ultimately played a large role in
surrender at Canyon de Chelly according to Carleton.
51

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 69.

52

THE LONG WALK, supra note 9 at 43.

53

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 56; THE LONG WALK,
supra note 9 at 43
54

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 111, THE LONG WALK,
supra note 9 at 43.
55

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 97.
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NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 97, 102.
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NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 107.
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NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 109-10.
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NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 107, 111.

60

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 107.

CC-BY-NC, Asian Business Consortium | AJTP

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3844035

Page 135

Guiora and Jackson: When Things Go Awry: Command Responsibility, Death Marches, and Unforeseeable Circumstances

soldiers did not intend to kill them, they more willingly
came forward to join the march to Fort Sumner. 61 As
resources were scant and winter was in full swing, the
choice to leave their homeland came as a decision of life or
death. Many Navajo realized the option was to freeze to
death or to accept the fate of surrender and relocation.62 As
a result, approximately 1,200 Navajo refugees surrendered
and began the march on the trail of The Long Walk on
January 31, 1964.63
3. The Long Walk
The actual and detailed events of The Long Walk have been
recorded inconsistently. While there are very few official
records from the US military regarding the tragedies that
occurred, some have been supplemented by newspapers in
the New Mexico Territory. On the other hand, there are
many oral records from the Navajo which have now been
recorded. We recognize that stories from both sides contain
gaps, truths, and exaggerations.64 This section attempts to
accurately reflect some of the actions that can only truly be
understood by those who were forced on The Long Walk.65
Among the many atrocities inflicted on the Navajo, the first
that should be noted is the physical conditions under
which they were removed from their homeland and
marched between 250-450 miles to Bosque Redondo.66 The
Navajo were marched in the dead of winter. 67 Many
Navajo were not adequately clothed, and the resources
collected at Fort Canby and Fort Wingate were depleted
quickly due to the mass surrender of the Navajo. As such,
many were almost completely naked.68
Clothing was not the only thing in lack of supply. As the
Navajo were marched, they were given foods to which
61

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 97 (“Only the fear of
being killed had caused many of them to hold out for this long,
and once this fear was removed, the major task of the Navajo
expedition would become one of logistics rather than punitive
expeditions.”).
62

THE LONG WALK, supra note 9 at 48, 59; see also NAVAJO
ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 97. Carson’s troops found several
frozen Navajo corpses as they traveled through Canyon de
Chelly.
63

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 111; THE LONG WALK,
supra note 9 at 59.
64

Interview Hampton Sides

65

THE LONG WALK, supra note 9 at 50-53.
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Denetdale Interview, supra note 40 at 15.

67

Denetdale Interview, supra note 40 at 16; NAVAJO ROUNDUP,
supra note 20 at 97, 114-16, 133 (soldiers reported frozen feet after
walking through Canyon de Chelly).
68

Denetdale Interview, supra note 40 at 16 (“They might just
have a piece of fabric to cover their private parts…”).
69

Id.; NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 121.

70

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 121.

71

Denetdale Interview, supra note 40 at 16.

72

THE LONG WALK, supra note 9 at 57.
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they were not accustomed.69 Many died from dysentery or
diarrhea by eating half-cooked bread made of unfamiliar
flour, rancid bacon, and green coffee beans, among other
foods.70
Unfortunately, the soldiers also treated the Navajo as less
than human as they marched them to Bosque Redondo.
“Women were raped and violated.”71 Groups were forced
to march as quickly as possible to Bosque Redondo, at a
pace of 10-20 miles a day.72 Many who could not keep pace
with the group, including the elderly and the pregnant,
“were taken out of line and shot by the soldiers.”73 These
atrocities occurred even though “Americans were under
strict orders to treat the Navajos kindly and fairly.” 74
Carleton’s soldiers also failed to protect the Navajos from
other enemies – including the New Mexican settlers,
Mexicans, and other Native American Tribes that lived in
the region. 75 As the Navajo were marched through
settlements from Fort Canby and Fort Wingate to Bosque
Redondo, the New Mexicans harassed the Navajo. 76
Additionally, Mexicans and other Native American tribes
raided the refugees for the slave trade.77 It is unclear how
many Navajo died on the road to Bosque Redondo.
However, the number of casualties only increased after the
Navajo arrived at their ‘new home.’78
In addition to the atrocities that occurred on the 250–450mile journey from Canyon De Chelly to Bosque Redondo,
the conditions of the reservation added further suffering to
the Navajo people.79 By spring 1864, approximately 6,000
Navajo (5,182 in May) and Mescalero Apaches occupied
Bosque Redondo, and by November the number had

73

Denetdale Interview, supra note 40 at 16.

74

Sides Interview, supra note 30 at 28 (“After all, this was an
experiment to prove to the Navajos that you can become
Christians and farmers and, you know, if you can't even get them
to the site without killing them, then this experiment is going to
be a failure.”).
75
Sides Interview, supra note 30 at 28; THE LONG WALK, supra
note 9 at 22.
76

THE LONG WALK, supra note 9 at 60.

77

Sides Interview, supra note 30 at 23; THE LONG WALK, supra
note 9 at 119-20 (When attacked, “the Navajos were in a sufficient
force to have resisted.” However, they “feared retaliation from
Carson’s troops if they killed the white men.”).
78

Sides Interview, supra note 30 at 28 (“There wasn't enough
food. The weather interfered. Navajos froze to death because
there weren't enough blankets. They weren't acquainted with the
kind of food that they were issued by the American Army. The
old and the sickly and the children who were already weakened
by this scorched earth policy of Carson got sick, and their
constitutions were already depleted so the march took longer and
it was harder--took a harder toll on them.”).
79

See generally THE LONG WALK, supra note 9 at 73 “lack of
adequate shelter, the constant shortage of food, the harsh climate,
and bouts of epidemic diseases, all of which took their toll.”
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grown to at least 8,570. 80 Well before this point, the
resources at Bosque Redondo had run dry.
The harsh conditions of the Long Walk were magnified at
Bosque Redondo as disease spread, already rationed food
was rationed more, and soldiers continued to harass the
women.81
As Navajo kept entering the reservation, Carleton soon
realized he was not prepared for what was to come.
However, he stayed optimistic in his reports, stating that
“If they can feed themselves, you can send in even
10,000.” 82 However, General Carleton’s experiment to
civilize the Navajo began to fall apart. The land on which
Bosque Redondo was established was not fit for farming,
and with the poor conditions, Navajos began to escape
from the reservation to return to their homeland.83 In 1867
the Navajos refused to plant. Eventually, in 1868, after
many investigations of Bosque Redondo, a treaty was
signed which allowed the Navajo to return to their
homeland. The treaty was signed on June 1, 1868, and
Navajos “streamed back to Navajo country.”84
4. The Aftermath
In the end, Carleton’s experiment failed, and “his exploits,
impressive as they were to the people of New Mexico, were
much less so in the East where the heroes of the ‘big war’
held the limelight.”85 The War Department in New Mexico
was reduced to a military district, and by the time the
treaty releasing the Navajo was signed, Carleton was no
longer in command. 86 His subsequent career was
undistinguished as he was reassigned to regular duty
following his time in New Mexico.87
Carson was assigned as supervisor at Bosque Redondo in
1864.88 He requested a transfer from this position on at least
three occasions before his transfer in September of that
same year. 89 Carson went on to serve as Carleton’s field
representative to the Plains Indians and finally was
assigned to the command of Fort Garland in Colorado
before he resigned in 1867.90
80

THE LONG WALK, supra note 9 at 75, 49.

81

Sides Interview, supra note 30 at 28 (“[T]he soldiers found
out that they could sleep with some of the Navajo women because
they were starving and needed money essentially.”).
82

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 143.

83

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 163 (“Beginning in the
spring of 1865, more Navajos escaped than surrendered or were
captured and the monthly census reports [at Bosque Redondo]
showed a steady decline in the population.”).

Neither Carleton nor Carson was prosecuted or tried for
the events that took place as a result of the forced march
and experiment at Bosque Redondo. In fact, Carson was
promoted to Brigadier General in 1865, in part for his role
as leader of the Navajo campaign. 91 The tragedy is that
there were officers who were punished or dismissed for
much less than the crimes committed against the Navajo.92
Ultimately, the lack of a strong influence of the doctrine of
command responsibility, along with the general attitude of
American settlers to Native American tribes, resulted in
Carleton and Carson being free from liability from the
actions of the Long Walk and relocation to Bosque
Redondo.
B. The Bataan Death March
1. Historical Context
Beginning in Fall 1941, before the attack on Pearl Harbor,
the United States began to rush planes, cannons, tanks, and
men to the Philippine Islands. 93 Japan was becoming a
major force and “America’s chief antagonist in the
Pacific.” 94 In the middle of World War II, the Japanese
Empire sought to expand its influence in Asia and decided
to attack the Western bases in the Pacific. 95 The attacks
would focus on the British in Singapore, the Dutch in the
East Indies, and the Americans in the Philippines. 96
According to the orders from General Gen Sugiyama, twostar General Tomoyuki Yamashita, two-star General
Hitoshi Imamura, and Lieutenant General Masaharu
Homma, respectively, were to lead these attacks.97
Although the Japanese Imperial Army was also bogged
down in battle across the barren flats in China, many
troops were pulled to complete the orders of the Imperial
General Staff.98 The Japanese quickly initiated the plans for
their initial attacks. By December 10th, the Imperial Army
completed its bombing of Pearl Harbor, Clark Field, and
other US bases in the Philippines, and attacked British
warships in the South China Sea. 99 In the proceeding
months, the Japanese would commit some of the most

90

Id. at 170.
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Id. at 169-70.

92

NAVAJO ROUNDUP, supra note 20 at 120. For example,
Captain Barbey was arrested and asked to resign after
succumbing to his weakness for alcohol. See also 72 Eben Everett
arrested as a result of a drinking problem
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2019).
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Id. at 56-57.

Id.at 169.
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horrific war crimes as they marched approximately 75,000
US and Filipino soldiers along the Bataan Peninsula.100
Before discussing the details of the events that occurred as
the Japanese invaded the Philippines, it is important to
understand the philosophy of the Japanese military. The
Japanese Imperial Army indoctrinated its soldiers with
three core doctrines critical to understanding the manner
of its engagement with foreign soldiers and civilians.
2. Japanese Military in WWII
The first doctrine traced its roots back to the Samurai
warriors who, as legends told, were “indomitable even in
defeat, virtuous even in [the] most vicious moments, and
most of all faithful – faithful to family, ancestors, and to the
feudal lord.”101 Summarized by the Japanese word Bushido,
this became the basis for ethical training in the military and
contributed to the rise of Japanese nationalism and the
“strengthening of civilian morale in . . . World War II.” 102
This idea of loyalty ran strong through the military even to
the point of self-sacrifice. In the Hagakure, a book teaching
principles of Bushido, it reads “Bushido or the way of the
warrior means death. Whenever you confront a choice
between two options, simply choose the one that takes you
more directly to death.”103 As such, to the Japanese infantry
(hohei),104 to lose one’s life – while a tragedy – was a showing
of one’s loyalty to his family and his nation. 105
Due to the idea that self-sacrifice was the greatest form of
loyalty, “surrender was . . . apostasy.” 106 Prior to WWII,
General Sadito Araki stated that “Retreat and surrender are
not permissible in [the] Army. . .To become captive of the
enemy by surrendering after doing their best is regarded by
foreign soldiers as acceptable conduct. But according to our
traditional Bushido, retreat and surrender constitute the
greatest disgrace and are actions unbecoming to a Japanese
soldier.”107 This disgrace did not stop at the soldier but cast
shame on “all those who had ever shared his name, living or
dead."108 As such, the Japanese infantry understood that war
meant victory or death.
The second doctrine was that “absolute obedience is
imperative in the army and that neither criticism nor
protest is allowed.” 109 To “hammer” this principle into

100
History.com Editors, Bataan Death March, HISTORY (June
7,
2019),
https://www.history.com/topics/world-warii/bataan-death-march.
101

NORMAN, supra note 92 at 79.
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Kenneth Pletcher, Bushidō, BRITANNICA (Sep. 9, 2019),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Bushido; IRIS CHANG, THE
RAPE OF NANKING: THE FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST OF WORLD WAR
II (Dec. 1991).
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NORMAN, supra note 92 at 81.

104

Id.

105

first-year privates, officers often used force to discipline
those who acted outside of given orders.110 Many first-year
privates were “beaten till their teeth fell out or eyes swelled
shut or they lost their hearing.”111 The treatment of these
new soldiers became a cycle across the Imperial Army.
Once they were promoted to senior privates, they became
bullies to the fresh conscripts. This ultimately produced
“2,287,000 men who had been savaged to produce an army
of savage intent.”112
The third doctrine that played a large influence in Japanese
Nationalism was that the Japanese were “second to
none.”113 While based on the same ideals of Bushido, this
doctrine reflects the ultimate actions of the Japanese
towards the US soldiers and Philippine soldiers and
civilians. The Japanese were taught to hate their enemy.114
As discussed in more detail below, the Japanese hate for
the enemy was clear in their actions. Even after the
American and Philippine soldiers had surrendered, the
Japanese rationalized that they were not yet prisoners.
Rather, they argued that “these men are still the enemy and
we are in a war” and as such, they had to kill them.115
Given the context of the Japanese desire to become a
superpower in Asia and the societal, ethical, and military
training described above, the events of the Bataan Death
March, while not justified, can be better understood.
Japanese soldiers had a heightened duty to their families
and nations which could only be fulfilled by obedience to
orders that came out of disdain for the POW on the Bataan
Peninsula. With this in mind, we turn back to the Japanese
invasion in the Philippines and the ensuing atrocities that
took place by order (or lack of order) of Imperial Army
leaders.
3. The Fall of Manila and the March
The Japanese troops continued to act swiftly following the
initial bombing on Clark Field and other American bases
on December 8, 1941. By December 22, 1941 (the first day
of the Japanese invasion) Philippine and American troops
were already backpedaling and General MacArthur was
relocating to the US Military outpost on Corregidor. 116 By
January 2, 1942, the Japanese had raised their flag in
Manila. 117 Over the next three months, the forces
108

Id.

109

NORMAN, supra note 92 at 79.

110

Id. (“This was the ultimate purpose of slapping.”).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. This is not unique to the Japanese.
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Id. at 212 (Japanese soldiers discuss killing POW’s at the
Pantingan River.).
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Id. at 49.
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Id. at 101.
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Id. at 65.
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barricaded themselves in the Bataan Peninsula. However,
due to the number of Japanese troops and the lack of
resources, American and Philippine forces surrendered on
April 9, 1942.118
“Within hours of the surrender, 14th Army Headquarters
realized its estimates, and thus plans, were worthless.” 119
American and Philippine soldiers were everywhere
coming from “roads, in the hills, [and from] jungle
trials.”120 By the afternoon of the 9th, the defeated soldiers
had been gathered at assembly points along the Old
National Road.121 Most were in poor physical condition, as
they had already been rationing food, and many had
contracted diseases.122 While being lined up, the soldier’s
valuables were taken from them. Those that refused to give
up their possessions were punished: some had their fingers
cut off for refusing to give up their rings, others were
beaten or killed. It suddenly became clear to the American
and Philippine soldiers that from that point on “anything
[could] happen.”123
The physical abuse that the Japanese soldiers took as firstyear privates became a method by which the Imperial
Army forced compliance on the prisoners as they marched.
A soldier was beaten for looking in a direction he was not
supposed to; walking too slow or too fast, or not at all;
talking to another soldier; and at times, for nothing at all.
The beating eventually became normal for some. As the
soldiers made their way from the bottom of the peninsula
up the Old National Road, they were not given water and
were fed very little – and what they were fed was old rice,
most of the time it had maggots in it. In the hot humid
weather, many died of hunger and fatigue. Others who
had trouble keeping up with the group were shot or
bayonetted and pushed to the side of the road. 124
Even others were killed for no reason at all except that they
were the enemy. Among the brutal acts committed by the
Imperial Army was the mass execution of American and
Filipino soldiers at the Pantingan River.125 Beginning in the
morning of April 12, 1942, these soldiers were lined up and
leashed to each other with telephone wire.126 Throughout
the day, Japanese soldiers (both by volunteer and by order)
killed approximately 400 prisoners.127 The remaining 1,200
soldiers were sent to march, like the rest, up the Old
National Road and continue to receive abuse from their
captors.

118

Id. at 154 (unconditional surrender the largest in
American history – 76,000 – will you treat them well? We are not
barbarians (153)).

When the prisoners were allowed to stop, they were
crowded into empty buildings or barbed-wire enclosures
“so tightly that they had little room to sit or lie down.”128
Only a third of the men who passed through certain
checkpoints got food “for the Japanese, chronically
undersupplied, habitually unprepared, and stoically
indifferent to the distress of the men who were their sworn
enemies, simply could not, or would not, feed them.”129 So
many of the soldiers had dysentery and other diseases and
ended up in excrement or vomit. With each day, the
surrounding area smelt of lavatories and dead bodies as
the Japanese forced their prisoners up the Old National
Road.
Unfortunately, the horrors of the march did not end
quickly for those who survived. The Japanese placed the
remaining of the surrendered soldiers into work camps
where they continued to be tortured and mistreated.
Soldiers were transferred from project to project,
reconstructing roads and bridges that were destroyed by
the initial attacks.
As American troops began to invade the Philippines, the
soldiers were placed on boats – laid like sardines in areas
of the boat with only one door which was often closed. The
only relief was when US troops finally defeated Japan on
the Philippine island and were able to invade Japan.
Lieutenant General Homma and General Yamashita were
among those in the chain of command that were convicted
of the crimes that occurred in the Philippines during
WWII. 130
C. The Holocaust Death Marches
1. The March to Nowhere
The Holocaust Death Marches have been called the “march
to nowhere.” In the same vein, the phrase “death march”
was not used at the time of the marches, but rather has
come to define the particular period in the Second World
War and applied to a specific paradigm in the War. The
marches started in a known place, the camp gate, but had
no known destination, much less any plan how to get
“there.” Similarly, these were not marches in the
traditional military context, albeit directed by military
commanders who were accustomed to military discipline,
command, and structure.
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Id. at 188.
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Id. at 164.

Id. at 187
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Id. at 161 (soldiers “told themselves that disease and
hunger had defeated them, not the Imperial Japanese Army. . .”).
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Id. at 166.
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Id. at 177. death on the road to nowhere

Id. at 344-45 (noting that “Hideki Tojo, war minister and
priminister for most of the war. . . and Lieutenant Masaharu
Homma, former commander of the 14th Imperial Army; conqueror
of the Philippines” were listed in the top eleven on “Japan’s
political panjandrum.”).
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Until camp commanders decided to leave the camp, they
imposed their will on a static, stagnant, dying population
deprived of any sense of humanity and decency.
Regardless of the extraordinary weakness, commanders
then led the victims on a physical undertaking for which
they were overwhelmingly unprepared on every
conceivable level. Above the physical challenge of walking
in weakened condition, there was the terrible cold to
contend with whilst dressed in the barest of clothes. Those
forced to march were left as is – most without shirts or
shoes. The harshness of the conditions was magnified
(understatement) as the cruelty of the commanders was
unabated by those begging for food or water and those
who were unable to keep pace were executed.
This accurately reflects the terrible reality whereby Jews,
who had been held in camps (primarily concentration and
labor), were forced to march by their Nazi commanders as
the Russian Army was approaching, in late 1944. The
circumstances were clear. The tide of the war had
significantly turned against Hitler’s forces and it was
increasingly obvious to most, perhaps absent the Nazi
leadership, that the end was near. It was only a matter of
time before the two forces would pinch the German
army.131 The meeting at the Elbe River, in May, 1945, was,
in retrospect, inevitable given the pace with which the two
forces moved.
While the military success was impressive, albeit costly in
human lives and material, it led to an unintended
consequence. The Jews were still held captive by the Nazi’s
-- primarily, but not exclusively in Poland where the death
camp Auschwitz-Birkenau was located. As the Red Army
was advancing from the east, German camp commanders
were faced with a single dilemma. What was to be the fate
of the prisoners who were held in these camps?
The options were limited, as the mere existence of the Jews
was evidence of the horrors of the Final Solution (Hitler’s
plan to exterminate the Jewish people). What execrated the
dilemma was that camp commanders were largely left to
their own accords, as the central German command had
broken down.132 Therefore, the fate of the surviving Jews,
whose situation was beyond dire, was in the hands of local
camp commanders whose primary concern was two-fold:
first, their own survival, and second, to destroy the
evidence of their actions.
These death marches reflect a paradigm whereby
commanders had absolute control over two distinct
population groups: soldiers and the civilians. While the
Jews had no idea where they were being taken, the same
also held true in many cases for the soldiers. The Jews had
intimate knowledge of the commander’s cruelty and
viciousness based on their camp experience and were
131
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forced to march were subject to the exclusive, and absolute,
control of the same commander. Absent execution or
escape, there was no Plan B other than to continue walking.
The German soldiers also had a justifiable fear as to their
fate if they encountered Red Army troops, given the
horrific war crimes committed by the Germans after
Operation Barbarossa (invasion of Russia, June 1941).
However, their fear was, perhaps, lessened by the view
that Jews were a commodity to be bartered to the Russians
in exchange for their freedom and the ability to seamlessly
re-integrate into the civilian population. The march had to
continue, however, without knowing if a “deal” could be
struck between particular Nazi commanders and Russian
troops, were they to meet.
2. BOR Labor Camp
The BOR Labor Camp in Siberia serves as an example of
the horrific conditions and actions of the commanders
during these marches. COL. Maranyi oversaw this camp in
a particularly cruel manner. Despite the fact that BOR was
a work camp, prisoners were whipped to death on various
occasions.133
Camp Commander Maranyi started the march from the
gate of the BOR camp in early September 1944. Although
there was no end point, the intent of Commander Maranyi
was to massacre the Jews upon crossing into Hungary,
where the prisoners originally came from. The victims of
the camp, and the walk to come, did not know this and it
is unclear if the soldiers knew this. Maranyi however,
never reached Hungary. As was later recorded:
Nearly 4,000 Hungarian Jews who had been conscripted
into forced labor since 1941 were led on a death march
towards Hungary from the Bor mines in Yugoslavia,
where the labor camps were concentrated, on this date
in 1944. About 1,300 of them were shot or killed by
exhaustion enroute; the others were deported to
Germany, where the great majority were murdered. A
second death march of 2,500 Jews began soon after;
several hundred of these liberated by Tito’s partisans.
Yugoslavia had been occupied and divided up by
German, Hungarian, Italian, and Bulgarian armed
forces. The death marches were a panicked Nazi
response to a massive Soviet 1944 summer offensive
which overran the Nazi concentration camp of
Majdanek and led to international exposure of
Germany’s genocidal activities. SS chief Heinrich
Himmler then ordered all prisoners in concentration
camps to be evacuated toward the interior of the Reich.
According to the Holocaust Encyclopedia, SS guards
had strict orders to kill prisoners who could no longer
walk or travel. As evacuations depended increasingly
133
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on forced marches and travel by open rail car or small
craft in the Baltic Sea in the brutal winter of 1944-1945,
the number who died of exhaustion and exposure along
the routes increased dramatically. . . . Thousands of
prisoners died of exposure, starvation, and
exhaustion.134
Tito’s freedom fighters ambushed the march, in Nitzsh,
Serbia, killing many of the guards (not the commander)
and setting the Jews free. This account is important from
our perspective due to the depravity and deprivation
imposed on the Jews during the march. Those actions are
Maranyi’s responsibility, regardless of the preparation and
training the soldiers or Maranyi had prior to the march.
The decision to leave the camp was Maranyi and he,
therefore, assumed responsibility for those forced to leave
BOR and participate in the march.

IV. HISTORY - COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
The legal doctrine of command responsibility imposes an
extraordinary duty on a commander; the phrase,
“command is lonely” captures its essence. Command is not
a democracy. Rather decisions on how to proceed rest
solely with the commander and are a matter of discretion,
practicality, capability, and resources. These decisions in
the past have led to much bloodshed and turmoil as
commanders face unforeseen circumstances in combat. To
understand the imposition of duty and liability that comes
from international law, this section will summarize the
history of the doctrine of command responsibility and
explain the intricacies of the law as it stands today.
The doctrine of command responsibility has come to form
relatively recently. Although its roots trace back through
military history, few instances of imposed liability were
recorded before the end of World War II. Before WWII,
individual countries imposed liability on commanding
officers through their own military codes. In the United
States, the application of this law was eventually adopted
in 1863 as General Order No. 100 or the Lieber Code.
Article 71 of the Code “provided for punishment of any
commander ordering or encouraging the intentional
wounding or killing of an already ‘wholly disabled
enemy,’ whether that commander belonged to the ‘Army
134
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William H. Parks, Command Responsibility For War Crimes,
62 MIL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1973).
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Id. at 11.
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of United States, or. . .an enemy captured after having
committed his misdeed.’”135
Eventually, nations began to recognize and call for a
uniform law that would apply to all participating in war.
In 1907, the Fourth Hague Convention set restrictions,
laws, and customs for war on land. Executed by forty-one
nations, Article 1 of the Annex established that an armed
force must be “commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates.” Additionally, Article 43 established that a
commander of a force occupying enemy territory “shall
take all measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far
as possible, public order and safety, while respecting,
unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country." 136 However, this lacked a comprehensive
application as war continued.
At the conclusion of World War I, the Commission on the
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on
Enforcement
of
Penalties
“recommended
the
establishment of an international tribunal appropriate for
the trial of crimes relating to the war.”137 This was followed
by demand of the Allies for the trial of 896 war criminals
pursuant to Article CCXXVIII of the Treaty of Versailles. 138
Despite these actions following WWI, there was continued
pressure to adjust international law to meet the new
challenges that arose during the years of World War II.139
Since WWII, the following events have defined the
standards by which commanders are responsible for
crimes that were committed in the course of war. First, the
case of In re Yamashita, which aggressively applied the
doctrine of command responsibility to convict General
Tomoyuki Yamashita. Second, the Nuremberg trials which
include proceedings that provide varying applications of
command responsibility. Third, the trial of Captain
Medina in response to the My Lai Massacre, which failed
to convict Captain Medina under this doctrine and,
instead, placed liability on the platoon leader. And fourth,
the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which provide
venues for the prosecution of war crimes on an
international level.140

sentenced to punishments laid down by law. . . The German
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12 were tried and 6 convicted (only one under command
responsibility). Parks, supra note 127 at 13.
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First. On October 29, 1945, General Tomoyuki Yamashita
was charged under the doctrine of command responsibility
for his role in the Battle of Manila. Despite the lack of
precedent, the commission convicted General Yamashita
by characterizing the failure of a commander to control his
troops as negligence. 141 To reach this conviction, the
tribunal found that “failure to exercise proper control over
[ones] troops” and “allowing subordinates to commit
atrocities” constituted a breach of duty.142
In the trial, the prosecution argued that “once the atrocities
were shown on a large enough scale” the burden was on
the defendant to prove that he “was unaware of the
atrocities or assert reasons why [he] should be excused
from the obligations he owed as a commander.” 143 The
defense argued that Yamashita was not aware of the
atrocities for various reasons. He asserted that the high
pressures he faced as American Troops began to attack the
Philippine islands prevented him from making personal
inspections on each soldier in his command. Additionally,
the Japanese communications systems had been
“completely disrupted” and, as such, General Yamashita
had reorganized his troops and given complete autonomy
of command to Generals Yokoyama and Tsukada to
oversee operations of the Shimbu Group (80,000 soldiers)
and Kembu Group (30,000 soldiers), respectively, while he
oversaw the Shobu Group (152,000 soldiers). 144
Despite these efforts to distance himself from the crimes
committed by his troops, the commission ultimately held
that “where murder and rape and vicious, revengeful
actions are widespread offenses and there is no effective
attempt by a commander to discover and control the
criminal acts, such a commander may be held responsible,
even criminally liable, for the lawless acts of his troops,
depending upon their nature and the circumstances
surrounding them.”145
The commission’s holding has been criticized as imposing
a theory of absolute liability on those in command. 146
141

Christopher N. Crowe, Command Responsibility in the
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Second. As Yamashita’s trial was ongoing, the Nuremberg
Trials commenced in Germany in an attempt to hold the
leaders of the Third Reich responsible for their actions. The
Nuremberg Trials are a series of proceedings that set forth
a new precedent by taking then existing laws, codified
treaties, and customary rules of engagement “and
applying them to . . . prosecuting the Third Reich.” 148 With
the creation of the London Charter149 and Control Council
Law No. 10, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) and
National Military Trials (NMT) conducted proceedings
that directly addressed command responsibility. 150 Two
notable cases include Case No. 12 at the NMT, United
States v. Wilhelm von Loeb, et al. (often referred to as the
High Command Case) 151 and Case No. 7 at the NMT,
United States v. Wilhelm List, et al. (often referred to as
the Hostage Case).152
These proceedings resulted in different applications of the
doctrine of command responsibility. In the High
Command Case, the tribunal determined that the mens rea
required to impose liability under the doctrine of
command responsibility should be actual knowledge. In
other words, the highest-ranking officer had to know of the
acts that were being committed and fail to do anything to
stop them. As a result, some of the Officers of the High
Command Case received minimal punishment.153
The tribunal in the Hostage Case applied a different mens
rea standard, namely the ‘should have known’ standard.
In coming to rely on this standard, the tribunal noted that
the finding of illegal reports at headquarters was enough

Id. at 203.

Enumerates crimes over which the Nuremberg tribunal
would have jurisdiction. These crimes included three broad
categories: “Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes
Against Humanity.” Id. at 172.
150

Crowe, supra note 134 at 208.

151

Case No. 12 at the NMT, United States v. Wilhelm von
Loeb, et al.

146
147
Id. at 206-08. The standard used to determine mens rea
was a ‘should have known’ standard – the commission
determined that the circumstances were so widespread that Gen.
Yamashita should have known and should have stopped the
crimes committed by his soldiers.
148
Ann B. Ching, Evolution of the Command Responsibility
Doctrine in Light of the Celebici Decision of the International Criminal
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167, 172–73 (1999).
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However, the evidence offered at trial contradicted
Yamashita’s claims of ignorance which opened the door for
this aggressive standard of mens rea to be applied. 147
Regardless of the criticisms and justifications of the
outcome, this case expanded the scope and provided a
binding precedent for the doctrine of command
responsibility.
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to impute the knowledge to the ranking officer. 154 By
applying this standard, it was ultimately held that “the
commanding general in occupied territory [held a duty] to
maintain peace and order, punish crime and protect lives
and property.” 155 The tribunal further noted that "those
responsible for such crimes by ordering or authorizing
their commission, or by a failure to take effective steps to
prevent their execution or recurrence must be held to
account.”156
Third. The doctrine of command responsibility was, once
again, applied differently in the prosecution of Captain
Medina for his role in the My Lai Massacre. 157 Captain
Medina was charged with responsibility for the massacre
because he had a “continuing duty to control the activities
of his subordinates where such activities were being
carried out as part of an assigned military mission.” 158
However, the standard of command responsibility applied
in In Re Yamashita “was not applied in the U.S. Army courtmartial of Captain Ernest Medina.” 159 Rather, the court
found him not guilty because he lacked ‘actual knowledge’
of the initial actions of his troops and “ordered an
immediate cease fire” when he became aware of their
actions.160
Captain Medina was among 14 people who were charged
with crimes relating to the incident. However, there was
only one, Lieutenant Calley, who was convicted. 161 At the
appellate level, the court navigated its decision by
touching on the underlying principles of Command
Responsibility. The court stated that
Soldiers are taught to follow orders, and special
attention is given to obedience of orders on the
battlefield. Military effectiveness depends upon
obedience to orders. On the other hand, the obedience of
a soldier is not the obedience of an automaton. A soldier
is a reasoning agent, obliged to respond, not as a
154
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The UCMJ is [US] federal law, enacted by Congress. The
UCMJ defines the military justice system and lists criminal

machine, but as a person. The law takes these factors
into account in assessing criminal responsibility for acts
done in compliance with illegal orders. The acts of a
subordinate done in compliance with an unlawful order
given him by his superior are excused and impose no
criminal liability upon him unless the superior's order is
one which a man of ordinary sense and understanding
would, under the circumstances, know to be unlawful,
or if the order in question is actually known to the
accused to be unlawful.162

Ultimately, Captain Medina was held to a lower standard
of liability under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ)163, rather than the international standard discussed
above. 164 Due to the inconsistent application, there has
been debate over whether the doctrine of command
responsibility was correctly applied in Captain Medina’s
case. 165 However, despite its critiques, this case again
shows the inconsistency in outcome when the law of
command responsibility is applied.
Fourth. In addition to the varying methods by which the
doctrine has been applied, the ICTY and the ICTR have
also played a significant role in further expanding the
reach of the doctrine of command responsibility. The ICTY
was created, and its statutes were adopted, by the U.N. in
1993. The ICTY clarified Protocol I by setting forth more
objective standards of actus reus and mens rea.166
The ICTY further defined its mens rea standard of “knew
or had reason to know,” signifying that the “United
Nations believed it to be the generally accepted rule for
holding commanders responsible for the acts of
subordinates during international armed conflicts.” 167
Although there was initial inconsistency in the application
of this standard at the trial level, the decision of the appeals
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visited Feb. 23, 2021).
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commander gains actual knowledge and does nothing, then he
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inaction he manifests an aiding and encouraging support to his
troops, thereby indicating that he joins in their activity and wishes
the end product to come about.”
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Chamber in the case of The Prosecutor v. Delalic et al
(better known as the Celebici case) clearly explains this
standard. The court in Celebici established that, to be liable
for actions of subordinates, “the commander must have
some information available to him, which puts him on
notice of the commission of unlawful acts by his
subordinates.”168
The ICTR has also broadened the scope of command
responsibility. While nearly identical to the ICTY statute,
the ICTR has also applied the doctrine of command
responsibility in a civilian party context.169
Ultimately, the doctrine of command responsibility is an
area of international law that will continue to see
development as conflict arises.170 However, the purpose of
this article is not to predict the future of the doctrine.
Instead of this theoretical approach, a practical approach
that looks beyond the language and formation of the
current law has encourages future discussion to determine
what else can be done when commanders are faced with
unforeseen circumstances and who should be held liable
for the crimes of the soldiers in action.

V. THE FINAL WORD
What have we learned and where do we go from here?
Contemporary domestic and international tension points
suggest we are entering a period of changing norms,
mores, and values. A casual glance at the newspaper
makes that clear. Political calculations suggest a rise in
nationalism, if not extremism; the ready willingness to
target vulnerable communities which endangers those
devoid of protection. The targeting of immigrants, much
less refugees and asylum seekers, is a reality highlighting
tension points between three distinct actors: military
commanders, politicians, and the vulnerable. The meeting
between the three is where the proverbial “rubber hits the
road.” In the three examples discussed in this article we
have highlighted the consequences when politicians create
an environment granting commanders extraordinary
wiggle room to exercise discretion and judgement. As we
have demonstrated in all three examples, the consequences
were fateful to those left to the “care” of the commanders.
The commanders—American, Japanese, and German—
conducted themselves in a manner not befitting those
entrusted with the care of the innocent. The Native
American’s forced to march from their homes were, in

168
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essence, subject to internal deportation; the American and
Philippine soldiers were Prisoners of War; and the Jews
forced to march were innocent civilians, notwithstanding
the Nazi regime’s intention to destroy European Jewry.
The commanders we examined failed as commanders. Of
that, there is no doubt.
Whether they were inherently evil or whether they reflect
the “banality of evil” is not the question.171 Rather, there are
two questions of importance. First, whether politicians and
national leaders have learned from the past and fully
internalized the consequences of creating environments in
which commanders or soldiers are not held accountable for
breaching their duty of care to the vulnerable? And second,
is the training received sufficient to ensure that when
commanders face instances “when things go wrong” the
events described in this article do not repeat themselves?
What serves as a powerful lesson, as uncomfortable as it
may be, is My Lai.
We would be remiss were we not to direct the reader to
what we learned from the actions of a particular US
military unit conducting a military operation in a hamlet
in South Vietnam. While dismissing the actions of
commanders in The Long Walk, the Bataan Death March,
and Holocaust Death Marches may be tempting,
examining Lt. Calley and others serves as a sobering
reminder regarding the consequences of poor training,
abysmal leadership, and an utter paucity of morality and
ethics. There is great danger in casually dismissing My Lai
as an example of a “few bad apples”; doing so instinctively
excuses the commander, establishing a paradigm of
tolerating what must not be tolerated. Commanders under
the stress of combat make decisions and tolerate behavior
that reflects, albeit on a smaller scale, what we have
examined in the three examples. Nevertheless, when we
consider the actions of Lt. Col. Nate Sassaman we must
take pause regarding how commanders conduct
themselves when things do, indeed, go wrong.
In January 2004, soldiers of the 3rd Combat Brigade, based
at Ft. Carson in Iraq, forced two Iraqis to jump “from an
embankment into the [Tigris River], where one of them
apparently drowned.”172 Despite the efforts to cover these
actions, word came out and “the soldiers involved . . . face
a variety of charges, some carrying maximum sentences of
10 years in prison.” 173 Despite his role as the units
commander, “Lt. Col. Nathan Sassaman, known for his
aggressive approach to battling insurgents in Iraqi cities
such as Balad and Samarra, told his men to mislead
171
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investigators.” 174 Testifying before a military court,
Sassaman explained, “I said something to the effect of
‘Don’t talk about the water’”.175 In addition to Sassaman’s
orders to suppress these actions “another officer, Capt.
Matthew Cunningham, warned the soldiers to corroborate
one another’s stories.”176 In explanation of his response:
Sassaman said he covered up the facts because the
soldiers assured him that the Iraqis had managed to get
out of the water. “I thought no harm, no foul if these
people walked away,” he told the court. “I said the
soldiers needed to be punished. I had hoped it would be
done at my level in a nonjudicial way.” He said he also
feared that insurgents would use the episode to
discredit his battalion, which had aggressively pursued
them -- in one case, taking part in 36 combat operations
in 48 hours. “Samarra is not the city of the good
Samaritan,” said Sassaman, a former West Point
quarterback. “It’s Dodge City. The [insurgents] were
killing us in the information war, and this would be a
reason to seize on this. It could drag all the good work
we did down the toilet.”
Another officer, Capt. Matthew Cunningham “said
forcing the Iraqis into the water was an effort to punish
the curfew violators by making them wet and miserable.
‘I believe it was a bad decision,’ he said. ‘But it was a
tactical mistake, not a criminal mistake. . .’” 177 “In his
closing argument, the prosecutor, Capt. Tom Schiffer,
said there was no question the Iraqis were thrown into

the river and in fact, he said, there was evidence that
[one of the soldiers] had been involved in a similar
incident in Balad.”178
While it would be an exaggeration to suggest lessons have
not be learned since The Long Walk, Bataan, and the
Holocaust, it would be false comfort to suggest history
does not repeat itself. In that spirit, our analysis leads us to
the following conclusions: First, dismissing My Lai and Lt.
Col. Sassaman as aberrations is “fool’s gold.” Second, the
need to train and re-train commanders and soldiers in how
to respond when things do not go according to plan has
never been greater. Third, the confluence of heightening
nationalism, extremism, and racism is combustible.
These three, together and individually, leave us with but
one final thought. Things can, and often do, go awry. The
burdens imposed on commanders demand we recognize
the fragility that separates choosing right and choosing
wrong when these circumstances arise.
It is for that reason that we call on national leaders and
military commanders alike to evaluate our uncomfortable
contemporary reality, look back in history, and ask
themselves one question: am I truly prepared to make the
right decisions when things go wrong?
History would suggest an uncertain answer.
--0--
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